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Abstract    
As  decidedly   underscored   by  a  recent   editorial   in  Nature   Neuroscience   (2010),   many experiments 
in cognitive neuroscience have been carried out with a sample that is not representative of the general human 
population,  as the subjects are usually university students in psychology. The underlying assumption of this 
practice is that the workings of the brain do not vary much even when subjects come from different  cultural  
groups.  Recent  research  by Henrich  et al. (2010)  shows  that this assumption  is unwarranted.  On several 
basic features of perception and cognition, Western university students turn out to be outliers relative to the 
general human population, so that data based on them should be interpreted with caution. In particular,  this 
situation seems to provide an argument for questioning  the conformity  of functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (fMRI) lie-detection to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert. Deception is a social 
phenomenon and it is related to mental functions, such as theory of mind, for which cross-cultural variability 
at the neural level has been detected. Furthermore, culture is a multi-dimensional variable whose effects are 
diverse. Thus, the use of fMRI lie-detection  in legal contexts may hinder the ascertainment  of truth  if the 
experimental  results  are not shown  to be conserved  in different  cultures. Cross-cultural  variability  in 
neural activation  patterns is just a facet of the broader issue of external and ecological  validity  for 
neuroscientific  experiments  on the detection  of deception;  nonetheless,  fMRI  lie- detection  is  unlikely  
to  meet  the  Daubert  standards  if  cross-cultural   variation  is  not  controlled  by appropriate experiments. 
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Introduction 
In this paper I discuss functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) lie-detection and claim that this 
technique should be used in courts only if its experimental basis includes checks for cross-cultural variation. 
The concept of „culture' refers to features of human groups that typically vary according to geographic areas 
and which depend on social learning; it includes shared attitudes, practices, and beliefs, together with 
languages and religions. 
Cross-cultural variation in human psychology is pervasive (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005; Nisbett & Masuda, 
2003) but it is rarely addressed in the behavioral sciences (Sears, 1986; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 
2010). Cross-cultural variability in psychology corresponds, in some cases at least, to cross- cultural neural 
variability (for a review about cross-cultural neural variation, see Han & Northoff, 2008). 
Lying is a social activity. As society and culture are closely related, deception is unlikely to be free of 
cultural variation on  both the psychological and the neural level. Moreover, culture possesses several 
dimensions (Hofstede, 2001), which are notoriously difficult to measure, so that it is much more complex to 
take this source of variation into account than others, such as for instance a mono-dimensional factor like 
age. For these reasons, the neuroscientists who are developing fMRI lie-detection should be aware of the 
problem and include cross-cultural experiments into their experimental strategies, in order to check if the 
Blood Oxygen Level Dependent (BOLD) activations that correlate with lying are conserved in different 
cultures. If this is not done, the experiments about fMRI lie-detection run the risk of having both a reduced 
ecological validity, i.e. the experimental settings are too heterogeneous relative to the parts of the real world 
they want to model, and a low external validity, i.e. the experiments are based on an idiosyncratic sample 
which is not representative of the general population. In this case the results would tell little about what 
happens outside the lab. If the experiments do not possess a sufficient degree of external and ecological 
validity, they are unlikely to provide error rates that are applicable to the real world and to gain general 
acceptance in the scientific community. But if the real-life error rates and general acceptance are absent, 
fMRI lie-detection will probably not be accepted as a valid expert testimony either in the jurisdictions that 
follow the Daubert ruling (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1993) or in those that adopt the 
older Frye (Frye v. United States, 1923) test. This is because both tests take general acceptance into account 
and  because one  of  the  Daubert standards is  the  “known or  potential error rate” in  real life applications. 
 
The concept of  'culture' 
First of all, some words are due on the way I avail myself of the concept of ?culture' which is central to my 
overall argument. According to my working definition, ?culture' refers to some properties of human groups 
that depend on social learning. Languages, religions, shared attitudes and beliefs, family structures and 
hierarchies are all parts of culture. Culture varies not only moving from one social group to another, but also 
from an  individual to  another in  the same group
1
. Both the geographical variability and the individual 
variability have behavioral consequences. For instance, Chua, Boland and Nisbett (2005) have demonstrated 
that Americans and Chinese feature different saccades
2
  patterns when they are shown a picture composed by 
a salient object and a background: Chinese tend to focus more on the background than Americans. As  to  
individual variation, priming  for  individualism or  collectivism
3
  performed on  bicultural individuals, such 
as Japanese-Americans, modulates both their ways of self-description (general, context- free descriptions vs. 
contextual descriptions) and the corresponding BOLD signals in areas related to self- representation (Chiao 
et  al., 2009). One of  the major problems in  dealing with culture as  a  factor of behavioral and neural 
variation is that culture is not easy to measure. One framework that I find helpful is Hofstede's (2001) five 
dimensional model, which collocates every culture along these dimensions: 
                                                 
1 See for instance Haidt & Graham (2007) about the different moral principles used by liberals and conservatives. 
2 Saccades are quick and simultaneous  movements of both eyes in the same direction. Human beings are usually not 
aware of performing saccades. 
3 Individualists  think  that  people  are  independent  from  each  other  and  that  they  are  characterized  by  a  
context- independent  set of personality  traits. Collectivists  see persons  as interconnected  and describe  them as 
embedded  in specific social situations, which constitute a part of their personality. 
 making decisions; 
1.   individualism – collectivism; 
2.   small – large power distance: It measures the difference in power between the most and the least 
powerful members of the group. If power distance is large, the leaders of the group are much more powerful 
than the subordinates. If power distance is small, the leaders of the group are almost on the same level as 
subordinates; 
3.   short – long term orientation: to what degree a group considers the remote future when 
4.   weak – strong uncertainty avoidance: how much a group is willing to take up risks; 
5.   masculinity – femininity: here Hofstede uses the Western stereotypes as metaphors, without any 
commitment about the actual psychology of men and women. Masculinity symbolizes an assertive and 
competitive stance, whereas femininity indicates a caring and modest attitude. 
According to this model, every society is characterized by a set of five values that describe its position along 
the dimensions, but any individual in the society might depart from the group's values. For instance, the 
United States (US) are considered as one of the most individualistic societies in the world (Henrich et al., 
2010), but a single US citizen can endorse collectivist values for a variety of reasons, such as religious tenets 
or family education. 
Lastly, it must be understood that ethnicity is not a synonym of culture, since immigrants retain their 
ethnicity for some generations (as long as they have children with other immigrants coming from the same 
ethnic group), whereas they rapidly lose their original cultural traits (Heine & Lehman, 2004). Individual and 
intra-national variation also prevents us from identifying culture with nationality, even though nationality has 
a great influence on culture. 
 
The sampling bias in the behavioral sciences 
This being said, I can continue with the sampling bias. Most experiments in the ?behavioral sciences' 
(cognitive science, economics and psychology) are carried out on culturally homogeneous samples. Arnett 
(2008) has surveyed the articles of the main peer-reviewed journals in psychology in the 2003-2007 period 
and has found that 68% of the subjects come from the US. Furthermore, 67% of this US population is 
composed of university students who take psychology courses. Therefore, the bulk of experimental subjects 
in the behavioral sciences is composed by a very specific human group: undergrads in psychology. 
On the one hand, this is an advantage, because very homogeneous samples allow the attribution of 
differences in the subjects' behavioral responses to the differences in the experimental conditions (e.g. 
distinct  stimuli),  which  are  manipulated  by  the  researchers.  Moreover,  university  students  are  easily 
available, cheap and permit a fast replication of the experiments. 
On the other hand, this poses serious questions of generalizability of the experimental findings. How can a 
researcher be sure that the experimental results are valid under different cultural conditions? This risk is 
particularly serious if we take into account that university students are a very specific sample relative not 
only to the global human population, but also to the US population. As Rozin (in Henrich et al., 2010) has 
pointed out, the university student experiences a unique life transition from family life to a peer-centered life. 
Moreover, they usually earn little or no income, live in a very liberal, educated, and open-minded 
environment (the campus), and have not built their own family yet. Therefore, their behavior on several 
accounts, such as economic decisions, is likely to be different even from that of the average US 30-year old 
person. This is evidenced by cross-cultural studies (Henrich et al., 2005) which show that the behavior of 
university students coming from Western, industrialized countries on some economic games like the 
ultimatum game and the dictator game is very different from the behavior found in many small-scale 
societies around the globe. A further consideration is that cultural variability does not only involve social 
behaviors like theory of mind
4
 and its neural correlates (Kobayashi Frank & Temple, 2009) or economic 
behavior, but has a much broader scope. For instance, on the behavioral level culture influences general 
strategies of reasoning (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001), the performance on the visual ?rod-and-
frame' task 
(Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003), and the effectiveness of visual illusions (Segall, Campbell, 
& Herskovits, 1963). 
Since one may understand the aim of the behavioral sciences as describing universal features of human 
behavior and accounting for those features by means of appropriate theories, experiments that are carried out 
on a very specific sample are of little utility to the pursuit of such a purpose, at least as long as they are not 
repeated in different human groups that diverge culturally. It should be noted that universality must not be 
intended as a digital variable: there are discrete degrees of universality that can empirically be tested. For 
instance, a cognitive phenomenon can be present in almost all human groups, but perform different functions 
in different contexts, or it can be consistently present and robustly perform the same function in all contexts. 
Universality can be tested by means of three kinds of experiments: the two-cultures experiment, the 
triangulation study, and the cross-cultural survey (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). 
In a two-cultures experiment a determined response to an experimental setting is taken into account. Two 
cultures that differ on many cultural dimensions are examined and the experimenters check whether the 
effect is conserved. If it is, the experiment provides some evidence for some degree of universality; if it is 
not, the difference in the behavioral effects of the setting must be traced back to a cultural dimension. But 
since the two cultures that have been examined differ on many dimensions, identifying the dimension that is 
responsible for the variation is not straightforward. In order to do so, a triangular study is needed. Such a 
study must start from a theory that allegedly explains the previously tested effect and that allows researchers 
to make hypotheses as to which cultural dimension is responsible for the variation. Then the experimenters 
take into account three cultures that differ from each other along two theoretically relevant cultural 
dimensions. For instance, if the theory leads to the prediction that dimensions D1 and D2 may be relevant, 
the cultures will be selected in such a way that cultures C1 and C2 differ on D1, and C1 and C3 differ on D2. 
If the difference is spotted between C1 and C2, D1 will be the relevant dimension; if the difference is found 
between C1  and C3, D2  will be chosen as explanatory instead. Of course, it must be assured that in the 
different cultures the experimental conditions are interpreted by the subjects in the same way and that the 
experimental protocol does not change. 
                                                 
4 Theory of Mind (ToM) or Mentalizing is the ability to attribute mental states (both cognitive and affective) to other 
human beings. 
A cross-cultural survey entails examining many human groups around the world, both in small-scale 
societies and in urban societies. If no differences are detected, it provides a strong evidence for some degree 
of universality. Nonetheless, it is costly and difficult to carry out, as experimental rigor cannot be maintained 
without considerable efforts when different research teams have to work in diverse environments. These 
cross-cultural investigations can be carried out by means of meta-analyses too, if sufficient data have already 
been gathered. 
Furthermore, there are some types of behavioral research in which universality is not an issue, so that 
idiosyncratic samples can be used without any problems in these cases. As Gächter (in Henrich et al., 
2010) correctly points out, US freshmen and sophomores can be very useful to falsify theories in behavioral 
economics. Falsification is about the research of counterexamples, not about generalizability, so that using 
undergrads as  participants in an experimental study is  appropriate when a  study aims at falsification. 
Furthermore, students are cognitively sophisticated as economic theories often require agents to be. 
This  being said  about the  sampling bias  and  how  to  address it,  let  us  look  at  the  part  of  the 
behavioral sciences that concerns me most in this paper: cognitive neuroscience. Here, the situation is 
probably even worse than in experimental psychology. According to Chiao (2009), 90% of the peer-reviewed 
neuroimaging studies come from Western industrialized countries. But the sampling bias would be a problem 
only if significant evidence for cultural variability at the neural level has been gathered. Cultural 
neuroscience provides substantial evidence to this effect. I briefly review part of this evidence (for a more 
comprehensive review, see Han & Northoff, 2008). Gutchess, Welsh, Boduroglu and Park (2006) have used 
fMRI to identify the neural correlates of a cross-cultural difference between Caucasian Americans and East 
Asians in image processing: Americans fixate a salient object more than East Asians. This proves that culture 
modifies neural function when non-verbal stimuli are processed. 
Zhu  and  colleagues (2007)  have  found  a  differential activation of  the  Medial PreFrontal Cortex 
(MPFC), which explains the distinct construal of the self in American and Chinese subjects. In Americans, 
whose concept of self does not include intimate relatives, the MPFC is activated only in response to 
judgments concerning the subject himself, whereas among East Asians the same area of the brain also 
responds to stimuli concerning close relatives, such as the subject's mother. 
Hedden and colleagues (2008) uncovered the neural correlates of another cross-cultural bias: East Asians are 
better than Americans at performing tasks that have contextual demands. Conversely, Americans are better 
than East Asians at ignoring the context if this is required. 
By means of an fMRI study on Japanese bilinguals, Kobayashi, Glover and Temple (2006) have found 
differences in BOLD activation in Japanese and American cultures when subjects perform false belief tasks. 
The false belief task is one of the main tests for theory of mind. 
Wong and colleagues (2004) have shown in a Positron Emission Tomography (PET) study that the 
processing of auditory pitch patterns engages the left or right insular cortex when the pitch has a linguistic 
function, as in Chinese, or not, as in English, respectively. This demonstrates that linguistic variation across 
cultures correlates with distinct neural correlates. 
One can conclude that cross-cultural variation at the neural level concerns both basic brain functions, such as 
visual processing, and 'higher' functions such as self-construal. How can this problem be tackled? MRI 
scanners are expensive and it is difficult to find them in developing countries or to bring them to the 
homelands of small-scale societies. Conducting cross-cultural experiments in cognitive neuroimaging is 
therefore difficult. Nevertheless, East Asia provides a rich and industrialized area in which cultural 
variability relative to the West is still sufficiently high to make two-cultures neuroimaging experiments 
meaningful. One possible agenda for cultural neuroscience is to look for the neural correlates of the 
behavioral variation that has been found between East Asia and the US in cultural psychology. The precise 
mechanisms by which culture can sculpt the human brain have not been elucidated yet, but the existence of 
brain plasticity is now an established fact. It has been studied both in the context of functional recovery after 
lesions (Wall, Xu, & Wang, 2002; Frost, Barbary, Friel, Plautz, & Nudo, 2003; Winship & Murphy, 2009) 
and in the context of learning (for instance Maguire et al., 2000). Brain plasticity yields a good theoretical 
framework to create detailed neural explanations of cross-cultural variability in behavior, but cultural 
neuroscience still has a lot of work to do in order to reach the neurophysiological level on which small neural 
populations are taken into account. In addition, there are well-known and warranted ethical limitations to 
neurophysiological experimentation in humans. 
In the next section I will examine fMRI lie-detection. 
 
fMRI lie detection 
Deception has been defined as “a social behavior in which an individual attempts to persuade another to 
accept as true what the deceiver believes to be untrue” (Ganis & Keenan, 2009, p. 465). Deception is a 
natural phenomenon that spontaneously develops in human beings (Spence et al., 2004). Deception as a 
mental task requires the suppression of a prepotent response, namely telling the truth; moreover, a new 
cognitive item, i.e. the lie, must be built up starting from the beliefs of the person to be deceived. Then the 
reactions of the deceived must be constantly monitored, so that consistency between the lie and their beliefs 
can be maintained. The lie can be very simple, as in cases in which one answers ?no' instead of ?yes' to a 
question, or quite complex when a whole piece of narrative must be devised to disguise the truth (Ganis, 
Kosslyn, Stose, Thompson, & Yurgelun-Todd, 2003). All this requires response inhibition, working memory, 
theory of mind, and other mental functions. Briefly, many high-order capacities of the human brain are 
engaged when one lies. Moreover, voluntary deception is essentially social: It is a way in which an 
individual manipulates her relationships with other human beings. Furthermore, there are many kinds of 
deception. In addition to the aforementioned distinction between structurally simple and complex lies, there 
are also the following differences: 
1.   self-related lies vs. other-related lies; 
2.   lies in which the subject says she did perform an action she has not carried out vs. lies in which the 
subject says she did not perform an action she has actually carried out (suggested by Kozel et al., 2009); 
3.   verbally expressed lies vs. non-verbally expressed lies; 
4.   well-rehearsed lies vs. improvised lies
5
; 
5.   lies in which a lot is at stake, in terms of rewards and risks, vs lies in which little is at stake. Since the 
phenomenon is inherently social and there are many kinds of lies, the existence of a simple 
biological marker for all kinds of deception is unlikely (Sip, Roepstorff, McGregor, & Frith, 2008). 
fMRI lie-detection has been tested in the lab using a variety of paradigms: a version of the polygraph 
Guilty Knowledge Test featuring playing cards (Langleben et al., 2002), a mock crime scenario (Kozel et al., 
2005, 2009), autobiographical memories, and others. Nonetheless, all of these methods have common 
shortcomings. 
Firstly, even if in some cases additional monetary rewards are promised to the subject if her lies are not 
detected by the experimenters (e.g. Kozel et al., 2005), the motivation to lie in the lab is very low relative to 
some real life circumstances, in which the risks and gains of deceiving can be tremendous. 
Secondly, in the lab, subjects are instructed to perform deception, so that the intention of lying is not 
spontaneous. Sip  et  al.  (2008) claim  that  the  lack  of  a  voluntary intention to  deceive prevents these 
experiments from studying deception. Instead, these experiments study “some of the complex executive 
functions that are associated with the phenomenon [i.e. deception]” (Sip et al., 2008, p. 48). This major 
shortcoming might be avoided by adopting an experimental setting in which subjects are put into a situation 
that indirectly induces them to be mendacious, on the lines of the experimental paradigm used by Greene and 
Paxton (2009). Nonetheless, to my knowledge no such study on deception has yet been conducted. 
Thirdly, in all of these experiments the presence of lies is guaranteed by the experimental design, whereas in 
a real life setting the relevant issue is whether someone is lying or not. The findings of an experiment in 
which the presence of lies is secured cannot be extended to situations in which lies may or may not be there 
(Langleben & Dattilio, 2008). 
Fourthly, the time between the fact about which the subjects are questioned and the scanning is usually short 
in lab settings (minutes or hours), whereas in real life it can be very long (months or years) (Spence et al., 
2004). 
Fifthly, the current paradigms compare two mutually exclusive conditions: Telling the truth vs. lying. In real 
life lies can be more nuanced: an account in which deception and what has actually happened are merged can 
be given. All of these factors contribute to creating a problem of external and ecological validity of fMRI lie-
detection studies. 
These  experiments  have  identified  a  series  of  brain  regions  that  correlate  with  lying  in  the 
experimental setting, i.e. that show an increased BOLD signal on a Lie minus Truth (henceforth written as 
Lie>Truth) contrast
6
. Many distinct brain regions have been indicated and researchers do not agree on which 
the most relevant regions are (Spence, 2008; Kozel et al., 2009), but some consistencies have been found 
(Monteleone et al., 2009). Firstly, there is no activation for Truth>Lie, showing that telling the truth is a 
baseline response. The regions that are regularly activated in Lie>Truth are associated with the cognitive 
                                                 
5 For this last dichotomy Ganis & Keenan (2009) found different BOLD activations relative to a baseline constituted 
by telling the truth. 
6 fMRI investigation is normally based on the subtraction of the BOLD signal in the task condition from the BOLD 
signal in the control condition. In this case lying is the task and telling the truth is the control. 
functions that have been predicted to be involved in lying: response inhibition, working memory, theory of 
mind, and others. The main areas that have been implicated are the MPFC (especially the ventromedial part 
known to be related to emotion processing, see Damasio, 1994), the orbitofrontal cortex, the anterior 
cingulate cortex, and the temporal parietal junction (TPJ). The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex seems to show 
an increased activation when lies are structurally complex, so that it may be related to the creation of a new 
cognitive item (Spence et al., 2004). If only one area is examined, the best detection in terms of sensitivity at 
p < 0.01 is achieved by using the MPFC as in this way an accuracy of 71% is reached (Ganis & Keenan, 
2009). Increasing sensitivity above this level entails a rise in the number of false positives. If the number of 
liars in a population is very low, the number of false positives can be higher than the amount of the true 
positives, making the test useless. Therefore, false positives must be minimized if the technique is to be used 
in real life. The relatively low specificity of the test is due to the scarce specificity of the correlation between 
brain regions and deception. Those regions carry out many other functions and therefore their activation does 
not necessarily indicate deception. At the state of the art, fMRI lie-detection is only slightly more accurate 
than the traditional polygraphy (Simpson, 2008). Nonetheless, fMRI presents two advantages in  comparison 
to  polygraphy. Firstly,  it  measures  a  Central  Nervous  System  (CNS)  signal  and  not  a Peripheral 
Nervous System (PNS) signal, therefore a  closer correlate of behavior and secondly, it is independent from 
arousal. In the next section, I will discuss some issues that arise from the potential application of this 
technique in criminal and civil proceedings. 
fMRI lie-detection in judicial settings 
I exclusively deal here with the US legal system, because to my knowledge fMRI lie-detection has not been 
proposed in Europe yet. Firstly, I examine the legal standards that regulate the acceptance of scientific 
evidence and some recent decisions. Secondly, I argue that both external and ecological validity are central 
when the admission of fMRI lie-detection in court is discussed. 
The admission of scientific evidence in US federal courts is regulated by Rule of Evidence 702, which 
concerns the testimony of scientific or technical experts. For the admission of the witness three conditions 
must be satisfied: 
1.   the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data; 
2.   the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; 
3.   the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case (Rule of 
Evidence 702). 
These conditions are applied together with other standards that were fixed by two decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the US, the aforementioned Frye v. United States (1923) and Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals Inc. (1993). The Daubert standard is valid in federal courts and in most state jurisdictions in 
the US. The Frye standard applies to the remaining state jurisdictions (among which are California and New 
York). 
The Frye standard simply states that expert witnesses can be admitted in courts if “the thing from which the 
deduction is made” has “gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs”. Therefore, 
general acceptance on the part of the relevant scientific community is required. This general acceptance has 
not been reached in the case of fMRI lie-detection, as a 2008 editorial on Nature Neuroscience demonstrates. 
Moreover, a  recent New York  State  decision in  a  civil  case  rejected the 
admission of fMRI lie-detection under Frye
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. 
The Daubert standard attributes to the judge the role of gatekeeper with regard to expert witnesses. The 
Daubert standard must ensure that the testimony is relevant to the case and has been obtained by means of 
reliable methods. To ascertain this, a test with five non-exclusive and flexible prongs is proposed. The points 
are the following: 
1.   empirical testing: the grounding theory must be falsifiable through experimentation; 
2.   peer-reviewed publication of the scientific bases of the testimony; 
3.   potential or known error rate of the procedure in real cases; 
4.   existence of technical standards for the procedure; 
5.   general acceptance in the scientific community. 
The admission of fMRI lie-detection under Daubert has been recently denied in the federal criminal case 
USA v. Semrau. The decision of Magistrate Judge Tu M. Pham
8
  excludes fMRI lie-detection on two 
grounds: 
1.   under Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert, because “there are no known error rates for fMRI-based lie 
detection outside the laboratory setting”, because “standards controlling the real-life application have not yet 
been established”, because Dr. S. J. Laken, who performed the scans, violated his own protocols when he 
rescanned Dr. Semrau on a positive result for deception, and because “fMRI-based lie-detection has not yet 
been accepted by the scientific community”; 
2.   under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, because the evidence was more prejudicial than probative, since the 
scans were taken by Dr. Laken without notifying the government. In this way, Dr. Semrau risked nothing in 
undergoing the tests, because positive results for deception would not have been released. 
As Magistrate Judge Pham himself notices, the rejection of expert testimony is the exception, rather than the 
rule. This makes his decision particularly relevant. 
The second point is not against fMRI lie-detection per se, but it concerns the contingent circumstances of the 
USA v. Semrau scans, so that it is not relevant for our discourse. The first point in contrast is paramount: 
fMRI lie-detection is not admitted inter alia because there are no reliable error rates. This is due to the fact 
that most of the current experimental work tells us little about real life application of this technique. 
Concerns about external and ecological validity are particularly relevant in legal contexts. In fact, judicial 
applications of fMRI lie-detection might be conducted on people who are medicated, who may have a 
psychiatric history, who are unwilling to cooperate, and who may try to use countermeasures to the test. 
However, the technique has been tested so far on subjects without any psychiatric condition, present or 
antecedent, who are unmedicated, and who are willing to follow the instructions of the experimenters. 
                                                 
7 Wilson v. Corestaff Services, decided May 14th 2010, Justice Robert J. Miller, 32996/07. Available at 
http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/lawandbiosciences/files/2010/06/CorestaffOpin1.pdf  (accessed   December   25th    
2010).   I thank Prof. Henry T. Greely for having pointed this case out to me. 
8 USA   v.   Semrau,    May   31st    2010,   Magistrate    Judge   Tu   M.   Pham,   No.   07-10074    Ml/P.   Available    
at http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/lawandbiosciences/files/2010/06/fMRI-Report-and-Recommendation1.pdf 
 (accessed December 26th 2010). 
Another factor, which is specific to legal settings, must be taken into account. As Simpson (2008) correctly 
points out, the current paradigm of fMRI lie-detection focuses on functions such as response inhibition and 
correlated regions in the brain. But response inhibition is likely to be very often engaged by a defendant in a 
criminal trial, since defendants must be circumspect about what they say in courts and 
repress feelings of outrage at accusations, if they are not guilty. Therefore, if lie-detection is carried out in the 
context of a criminal trial, response inhibition seems to be an unreliable marker for deception. This shows 
again that the experimental paradigms used so far might have little bearing on how deception outside the lab, 
and specifically in a court, is detected. 
This allows us to conclude that fMRI lie-detection is unlikely to be accepted under the Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702 and Daubert unless problems relative to external and ecological validity are solved. 
In addition to this, I argue that cross-cultural validity is an important issue in this set of problems and that it 
needs to be addressed if fMRI lie-detection is to enter courts under the laws currently in force. For this claim 
I present four arguments. First, as briefly mentioned above, Kobayashi and her co-workers (2006, 
2007) have shown that different areas of the brain are activated in East Asians and Caucasian Americans 
when they perform the false belief task. In particular, the TPJ activation would be culture-dependent and 
specific to English-speaking cultures (Kobayashi Frank & Temple, 2009). Nonetheless, Adams et al. (2009) 
have found a consistent activation of the posterior part of the superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), which 
partially overlaps with the TPJ, in both American and Japanese subjects. But Adams and co-workers (2009) 
used a different task than the one that Kobayashi Frank and Temple (2009) availed themselves of. The task 
used by Adams et al. (2009) is non-verbal and based on eye stimuli, whereas the false belief task is normally 
verbal. The different results of the two groups might be due to the distinct stimuli that were used. Despite 
this, researchers agree that the brain areas activated during ToM tasks depend on cultural background. 
Furthermore, culture impacts on ToM in other ways. For instance, people are better at detecting mental states 
in targets belonging to their in-group relative to out-group members and different areas of the MPFC are 
activated when subjects are asked to use ToM on targets that are respectively similar or dissimilar to 
themselves (Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006). From this I can conclude that the neural underpinnings of 
ToM show a high degree of cross-cultural variation. If ToM is a necessary cognitive component of deliberate 
deception (and it is difficult to think it is not, as deception requires a manipulation of another's beliefs), this 
cultural variation is likely to be shared by deliberate deception too, even though experiments are needed to 
confirm this theoretical prediction. And if BOLD patterns varied significantly across cultures in deception, 
fMRI lie-detection would risk being unreliable when a single experimental paradigm is used on subjects 
belonging to different cultures. 
Secondly, the sheer number of immigrants in the US constitutes a good argument for cross-cultural checks. 
There were 38 million first-generation immigrants in the US in 2007 (Segal, Elliott, & Mayadas, 
2010), amounting to about 12% of the US population. If fMRI lie-detection was used in court, more than one 
out of ten suspects could potentially show cultural variability in the neural correlates of lying, assuming 
arguendo that immigrants end up under trial or in civil litigation with the same frequency as the general US 
population. Therefore, if cross-cultural validity of fMRI lie-detection is not checked by means of appropriate 
experiments, errors could be widespread, leading to sub-optimal outcomes of judiciary procedures. Of 
course, the real amount of cultural variation in the neural correlates of deliberate deception cannot be 
estimated without actual cross-cultural experiments. 
Thirdly, culture is different from other forms of variation in that it has many dimensions and components, 
together with a degree of individual variation. Unlike age, which is mono-dimensional, culture is manifold 
and therefore difficult to handle. Each cultural dimension could have a different effect on the neural 
correlates of voluntary deception, so that adapting the experimental setting of the technique to the culture of 
the individual to be tested might prove a daunting task. A careful measurement of the different cultural 
dimensions of the individual might be required. If the BOLD signals found during deception varied with 
culture, it could be extremely complex to devise an fMRI lie-detection technique suitable to use in courts 
under Daubert, since the error rate would be high. On the contrary, assuming arguendo that the neural 
correlates of deception vary with age, it might be easier to modify the experimental paradigm to factor this 
source of variability in, since the age of every person can be easily assessed. 
Fourthly, the social nature of deception makes it theoretically likely that culture plays a big role in shaping 
this phenomenon, as culture, unlike for instance age, is a source of variation that results from human 
sociality. Deception requires a continuous surveillance on the beliefs of the deceived, an estimation of the 
long-term consequences of deception, and a maintenance of trust by means of pseudo-cooperation (Sip et al., 
2008). Variations in belief systems and in what is considered to be advantageous or disadvantageous could 
thus make substantial changes in the psychological nature of deception. Since psychological differences are 
often coupled with underlying neural differences, this variability would affect BOLD signalling as well. 
I am not claiming that the neural correlates of deception vary with culture, but that from the theoretical point 
of view this is likely to be the case. This hypothesis must be addressed by means of cross-cultural 
experiments. 
There are of course many other legal and ethical issues that are raised by fMRI lie-detection in a legal 
setting. Firstly, there is the concern that lie-detection might illegitimately reduce the prerogatives of the 
finder of fact, who has inter alia the role of assessing the credibility of witnesses. Then, we find the so-called 
„CSI effect', as Simpson (2008) states it: 
 
The aura of big science and high technology  surrounding  complex and expensive  tests may lead to an 
overestimation   of  the  reliability   and  utility  of  fMRI  lie  detection   among  lay  people,  including   
law enforcement personnel and other investigators, judges, and jurors (Simpson, 2008, p. 496). 
 
A third issue is related to the Fourth and Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution. Concerning the Fourth 
Amendment, fMRI lie-detection could be seen as an unreasonable search and seizure and as a violation of 
the individual's cognitive freedom (Wolpe, Foster, & Langleben, 2005) if it is performed without an 
appropriate warrant. Concerning the Fifth Amendment, forcing the defendant to undergo lie-detection might 
be interpreted as an instance of self-incrimination. These problems are very important and must be carefully 
considered when discussing the ethical and legal acceptability of fMRI lie-detection in court. Nonetheless, 
dealing with them in depth would lead me astray as they are not connected with cross-culturality and because 
they play a minor role in the USA v. Semrau landmark decision. In the next section I will address some 
possible objections that can be made against my arguments. 
 
Discussion of objections 
 
Kozel and colleagues (2005, 2009) have done much to tackle the external and ecological validity 
problem, of which the cross-culturality issue constitutes a part. In particular, Kozel et al. (2005, 2009) used 
quite diverse samples, which cover a broad age interval, different ethnicities, professions and levels of 
education. None of these factors is significantly correlated with the results of the experiments. This 
strengthens the external validity of the study. Moreover, the more recent study makes use of a mock sabotage 
scenario which is much closer to a real life situation than the previous scenarios (subjects are asked to go to a 
separate building, find a CD containing evidence of a crime, devise a way to destroy it, and go back to the 
experimenter; a phone rings in the room where the CD is kept in order to enhance emotional stress). This 
increases ecological validity. Finally, Kozel et al. (2009) addressed the aforementioned problem of the time 
interval between the relevant action (in this case the sabotage) and the scanning. They have brought the time-
lapse to 105 hours, but it is not clear whether this time interval is sufficient to solve the issue, as in real legal 
applications the time would probably be much longer. Nevertheless, this is another step towards a greater 
ecological validity. 
Does the work of Kozel and colleagues (2005, 2009) undermine the legitimacy of requesting cross- cultural 
checks? I argue it does not, because experiments were carried out in a US university, using a sample of 
general US residents, and because ethnicity cannot be identified with culture. For instance, African 
Americans and Western Africans may be very similar from the ethnic point of view, but they undoubtedly 
differ a lot along many cultural dimensions. Even though the populations used by Kozel et al. (2005, 2009) 
are diverse, they are likely to be relatively homogeneous from the cultural point of view, as they are mostly 
composed of people born and raised in the US. If a significant proportion of first-generation immigrants had 
been included, more precise conclusions about the need of cross-cultural checks could have been drawn. This 
does not detract from the value of the studies conducted by Kozel and colleagues (2005, 2009), which 
according to my view is the only research on fMRI lie-detection that takes the important problem of external 
and ecological validity into account. 
A second important objection refers  to  the current practices of  lie-detection and  the role cross- culturality 
plays in them. Juries currently evaluate the truthfulness of witnesses not only by the plausibility of their 
statements and by the consistency of their account, but also through a gamut of behavioral cues (fidgeting, 
speed of speech, keeping eye contact with the jury, and so on) whose reliability is not above chance (Rand, 
2000; Ganis & Keenan, 2009; Schauer, 2009). Nevertheless, jurors may consider these cues 
to be quite reliable. It is likely that these clues undergo cultural variation
9
: What is considered to be a sign of 
reliability can obviously change across cultures. Specific evidence to this effect is available: e.g. Bond and 
colleagues (1990) have shown that American and Jordanian observers rely on partially different sets of cues 
                                                 
9 I thank one anonymous referee for pointing this out to me. 
to detect deception. Therefore, it may be the case that for instance immigrant defendants are already 
disadvantaged in trials because they do not know what kind of demeanour they are supposed to keep in front 
of the jury in order to look truthful. They might abide the unwritten rules of their home culture and use a 
body language that does not match the expectations of the jurors. As Rand (2000) points out, truthful 
African- 
American witnesses could be seen as liars by Caucasian American jurors because of this 'Demeanor Gap'. 
Therefore, so the objection goes
10
, we already have a cross-culturality problem in lie-detection. This renders 
a cross-culturality problem in fMRI less important, as we would simply not solve a problem we already have 
in the current situation. Continuing on the same lines, as fMRI is much more accurate than behavioral cues 
as a tool of lie-detection, it would be a good idea to adopt it, since it simply keeps the cross-culturality issue 
unsolved, but provides a much higher detection rate. According to Bold (1990), both American and Jordanian 
observers have detected lies with an accuracy rate of slightly more than chance (about 54%). FMRI lie- 
detection reaches more or less 70% (Ganis & Keenan, 2009) without false positives. 
To this argument I respond that the „CSI effect' generates a big difference between lie-detection by bodily 
cues and fMRI lie-detection. The jurors would consider the latter as 100% accurate. Jurors would probably 
have some doubts about truthfulness assessment via body language and voice pitch, whereas fMRI lie-
detection seems to eliminate all uncertainty. Therefore, cultural biases in current trials produce milder harms 
than those that would result from alleged cultural biases in fMRI lie-detection. Given the CSI effect, false 
negatives in fMRI lie-detection might cause severe trouble. Then, if we move from this level to the legal 
standards for admission, we notice that this argument is irrelevant for the conformity of fMRI lie-detection to 
the Daubert requirements. Already having a problem in our current practices does not make the case for 
fMRI lie-detection relative to Daubert easier. 
A third objection claims that we should not wait to use fMRI lie-detection, since: 
1.   the current practices of lie-detection are really bad (see the behavioral cues above); 
2.   there  is  a  huge  societal  demand  of  lie-detection  (Langleben,  2008),  such  that  the  US 
government continues to use polygraphy even though its accuracy is far from being perfect; 
3.   current methods of extracting information, such as waterboarding, are cruel and violate human rights 
(Spence et al., 2004); 
4.   cross-cultural checks would take a long time, a time that we cannot allegedly afford to lose. 
My response to this is threefold. Firstly, lie-detection is not mind-reading, which is at present a totally 
futuristic technology, so that fMRI lie-detection cannot be considered an information extraction technique. 
Therefore it is improbable that fMRI will replace forms of torture in the near future. Secondly, using fMRI 
lie- detection without checking for generalizability might entail sub-optimal outcomes of the judicial 
processes, such as punishment of the non-guilty, acquittal of the guilty, and payment of undue 
compensations. It is not clear if an early use of fMRI lie-detection would make criminal or civil trials better 
in the present situation. Given the possibility of a ?CSI effect' with regard to fMRI lie-detection, the risk that 
                                                 
10 It should be noted that this objection is not proposed by Rand (2000), but is rather a theoretical reconstruction  of a 
possible line of argument. 
it would not improve trials is significant. Thirdly, the societal demand for lie-detection can be questioned 
from two perspectives. On the one hand, it might be argued that the demand for lie-detection is an American 
peculiarity, maybe even an obsession, as historian Ken Alder (2007) has claimed. On the other hand, this 
demand can be cast into doubt from the ethical point of view. Is this demand warranted? What kind of 
balancing between security and individual liberties do we want to adopt? How are we to interpret the 
citizens' cognitive freedom? This is an 
issue I cannot discuss here, but of course the legitimacy of this societal demand cannot be taken for granted. 
As a matter of fact, neuroethics experts like Levy (2007) have argued that early adoption is the main risk 
when neuroscientific lie-detection is discussed. 
The fourth objection comes from Schauer (2009): he denies the relevance of any kind of scientific 
considerations concerning external and ecological validity. Schauer argues: 
 
If the ease of telling an instructed lie in the laboratory correlates with the ease of telling a real lie outside 
the laboratory,  research on instructed lies is no longer irrelevant to detecting real lies. With any positive 
correlation  between  instructed  and real lies, experiments  on the former will tell us something  about the 
latter, and whether that 'something' is enough depends on the uses for which the research is employed. 
That  which  is  inadequate  for  scientific  publication  or  criminal  prosecution  might  be  sufficient  for  
a defendant seeking to suggest reasonable doubt (Schauer, 2009, p. 102). 
 
The overall point Schauer (2009) is  making  is  that  legal  and  not  scientific standards matter in assessing 
evidence in courts. Both external and ecological validity are scientific standards and therefore are allegedly 
not relevant in a legal context. It is sufficient to have 'something' that binds the lab setting and real life to 
permit some use of the experimental results. Therefore, even though fMRI lie-detection has some problem of 
external validity on the scientific level, it could be used in legal settings, such as civil litigation, where the 
standards of evidence are not “beyond a reasonable doubt”, but “a preponderance of evidence” or “a 
reasonable suspicion”. 
What surprises in this account is that Schauer's (2009) arguments ignore the Federal Rule of Evidence 
702 and Daubert altogether. These norms state that the legal standards for expert witness are at least in part 
scientific standards. If these scientific standards are not met, the evidence cannot be legally admitted. This 
also applies to all arguments for differential application of fMRI lie-detection (admissible in civil cases but 
not in criminal cases; admissible for the defense but not for the prosecution inside criminal cases) at the 
federal level. The Federal Rule of Evidence governs proceedings in the federal courts of the US whatever the 
case at  issue (civil or  criminal), so  that there seems to  be  no  room for  differential application. Judges, as 
gatekeepers, must decide on admissibility on a case per case base: every use must be separately evaluated in 
its specific context. Nevertheless, the federal judge must abide the Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert in 
doing so. Therefore, external validity cannot be dismissed as being merely scientific and not legally relevant. 
The fifth and last objection underlines that no cross-cultural variation was found by using behavioral tests for 
deception such as the polygraph
11
 and that no cross-cultural neural variation has been reported so far for 
deception paradigms. The two points seem to show that the worry I am expressing is implausible. If 
there is no behavioral cross-cultural variation for earlier lie-detection techniques and neural cross-cultural 
variation has never been detected in deception, maybe there is no good reason to presume that the latter can 
be a problem for fMRI lie-detection. To this I reply that it is difficult to find cross-cultural variation in a test 
if this is not explicitly searched for, especially if there is no way to double-check for the correctness of the 
result. If a polygraph is used in a real-life setting and signals a suspect or witness as a liar, it is not so easy to 
check whether the machine is right or not, because the reliability of the subject was doubtful in the first 
place. Furthermore, behavioral researchers often start from the implicit assumption that cross-cultural 
variation is negligible, so that they do not notice this phenomenon unless it is macroscopic. To the best of my 
knowledge, neural cross-cultural variation in deception is yet to be tested. I would welcome any 
experimental attempt either to show its presence or to demonstrate its nonexistence. 
 
Conclusion 
The long and the short of this paper is that cross-cultural experiments on fMRI lie-detection should be 
performed before this technique enters courts, because the lab experiments with US citizens risk having an 
unacceptably low external validity. As a matter of fact, I suggest the technique cannot live up to the Daubert 
standards without such checks, because no error rate calculated in the lab can be projected onto real life 
without them. I do not take any position about the ethical acceptability of fMRI lie-detection, but argue that 
more neuroscientific research is needed (not only in the cross-cultural field) in order to assess its full 
potential both legally and morally. I therefore encourage and endorse more funding for fMRI lie-detection 
research. Only sound and carefully conducted empirical research can lead to new forensic technologies that 
can be useful to ascertain the truth and to justly determine legal proceedings. 
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